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Abstract: In general Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) deploy multi-hopping 
techniques to pass messages to nodes far beyond their communication ranges.  
Several protocols and routing algorithms have been proposed in this context.  
However, most of these proposals assume that nodes on their communication path 
are willing to relay messages to each other without obstructions.  Therefore, these 
schemes are not immune against selfish or black-holes attacks. There are no clear 
rules of defense against this misbehavior, since routes in MANETs are not known 
in advance as the topology is highly dynamic.  In this paper we propose, model, 
simulate and verify a variant of the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) 
protocol, named Reliable (R-OLSR) to detect and isolate selfish behavior during 
packet forwarding.  The main contribution is the traffic monitoring in time on each 
multiple relay point (MRP). The abnormality in traffic patterns on MRPs in 
vicinity indicates for selfishness and trigger topology update in order to isolate 
such nodes. The proposed rules for defense are general enough to be applied to 
other proactive or hybrid routing protocols disseminating full or partial link state 
information throughout the MANETs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are spontaneous networks.  They instantaneously 
establish communication infrastructure when it may not be present or partially destroyed. 
MANETs are easy to deploy and cheap to implement for short-range radios.  However, 
mobility causes route changes continuously.  Data packets must be routed via dynamic set of 
forwarder nodes and MANETs routing protocols are designed specifically for use in multi-hop 
wireless mode. Although many routing algorithms have been proposed to increase reliability of 
data delivery, in general they are based on contact opportunity; i.e., they implicitly assume that 
all nodes are willing to forward packets for others.  Furthermore, since the wireless medium is 
shared, MANETs are completely exposed to the outsiders and there is a potential Denial of 
Service Attacks (DoS) [5]. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) developed for wired-networks are 
unsuitable for ad hoc networks with dynamic topology, since in wired-networks data 
monitoring is performed at data concentration points such as switches, routers and gateways 
[4].  IDS in MANETs require distributing services on different nodes and overcoming the 
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limitation of wireless medium bandwidth, transmission rates, and  concerns of energy, 
processing and memory limitations.  Different attacks affecting the performance of MANETs 
and some security issues are proposed in [1,4,6]. These mechanisms are not suitable for the 
resource constraints mobile devices, i.e., bandwidth limitation and battery power, since they 
results in traffic overhead for exchanging and verification of keys. The most used reactive 
approach is local monitoring. After unicasting data to a neighbor, the sender node overhears for 
a given period of time to check if the receiver node forwards the data further. Some monitoring 
approaches are based on the local promiscuous mode monitoring, such as ‘Watchdog’, 
‘Activity-Based Overhearing’, and ‘Probing’. Other rely on the employment of 
acknowledgments (ACKs), such as ‘End-to-end AKC’, ‘2Hop-ACK’.  
The motivation of this paper is to find a distributed solution for reliable behavior of routing 
protocols against selfish behavior on packet forwarding overcoming the shortcomings of local 
monitoring schemes. Our solution is not based on acknowledgments by the destination nodes 
and does not depend on fixed preconfigured thresholds. Instead, we study which criteria should 
be analyzed to trigger topology update in order to isolate selfish or black hole nodes. These 
nodes are defined as shown in Fig. 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.. Degree of selfishness. 
       
 In the current MANETs, mobile nodes implement Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) 
protocol [6]. The inspiration of using OLSR in you research is mainly due to the privilege roles 
of multiple relay points (MRP).  Thus, we define clear rules for defense against selfishness on 
MPR nodes observing them as intermediate routers. OLSR uses topology control messages to 
discover and then disseminate link state information for all nodes throughout the MANETs.  
Individual nodes use this information to compute the path to destinations using “shortest hop” 
scheme. Currently, OLRS is designed to consider some degree of willingness of a node at the 
network layer for instance battery drain. We enhanced OLSR to consider willingness at the 
application layer, for instance user selfishness. A formal model in UPPAAL [2] to detect the 
selfish nodes in MANETs is presented and a solution how to overcome this misbehavior in 
routing is modeled, simulated and verified. On the basis of the results achieved from simulation 
and verification, a formal model of Reliable OLSR protocol (R-OLSR) is evaluated and proved 
to be secure against selfish nodes. 
 
2. THE MODEL OF THE R-OLSR PROTOCOL 
2.1 The concept of the R-OLSR 
 
R-OLSR is designed and modeled to be secure against selfish nodes according to some rules 
for defense on MRP nodes. Each MRP monitors the sent traffic of nodes in vicinity for 
consecutive periods of time and isolates selfish nodes by topology update. Each sender MRP 
is an observer (MRPobs) and checks whether the receiver MRP or 1-hop nodes (observed 
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node) forwards the data further. The MRPobs starts its own chronometer (CHRobs). A 
configurable chronometer timeout (CTi) for each MRPi is defined by three interval slots - s0, 
s1 and s2. MRPobs overhears the sequence number (SN) of sent data packets in vicinity and 
records their sending time as particular slot.  When the MRPobs overhears the packet with the 
same SN, which has been sent in the same time slot, MRPobs synchronized the chronometer 
of the observed node with his own. If it is no selfish node, the forwarding delay (FDi) is zero 
and the sent traffic has the same patterns in all three slots on the CHRobs and CHRi , mainly 
in slot 0 and 1. However, if the observed node is selfish, its chronometer is not synchronized 
in time and when it forwards some of the packets that happens mostly in slot 2, when the 
time goes over the CTi significantly. The main idea is that the clock of a selfish MRP is 
synchronized with a large delay, which results in different ratio between sent traffic 
recorded.   
The degree of selfishness (Ds) is estimated according to the shape of the traffic patterns. The 
estimated degree of selfishness EDs(λ) is a function of the ratio λ related to data sent in the 
first and last slot, as shown in equation 1 
 
(1) λ= trafficSent[MRPi][s2]/trafficSent[MRPi][s0] 
 
The results of the simulation have shown that when selfishness tends toward black holes, the 
ratio between data in third and first slots is bigger than certain threshold, set to 3 in this case. 
Then isolation of this node is imminent. When selfishness is moderate, the ratio between 
data in third and first slots is less or equal to certain threshold set to 2, in the simulation. 
Then the willingness of this node is significantly reduced. Topology update is triggered in 
both cases. 
 
2.2 The Formal Model of the R-OLSR 
The MANETs Node model used to evaluate the R-OLSR protocol is shown in Fig. 2. To verify 
the model in UPPAAL, a few assumptions were made to avoid an excess states: (1) The model 
consists only of 12 Node templates and only 2 of them are selfish; (2) Links were assumed to be 
bidirectional; (3) Topology Control is realized as global variable and represented as a 
connectivity matrix; (4) Unique source and destination were assumed; (5) The local monitoring 
scheme has been implemented only to monitor MRP nodes in vicinity. 
Three types of messages are involved as structures: hello_beacon, topology_control and 
data_packets. Unique sequence number to each data message is deployed to ensure that a given 
message is not retransmitted more than once by any node.   The sequence number is increased 
by 1 every time the message is transmitted by a sender node. The beacon period Htime, clocks 
x and y are used as timeout bounds for initializing phase, local and global topology discovery. 
The event model generates a Boolean !INIT timeout to move all the nodes from their setup  
phase (START) to their beacon forward, beacon finishing and update topology ( SEND_TC) 
states. The Node model starts in the LISTEN state and remains there unless it receives a 
message as of type TC, HB,  internal event from the EG model or data packet. The message is 
only received by a node template if the connectivity matrix confirms that a link exists between 
the current node and sender node. The connectivity matrix (CM) defined in the global 
declarations is utilized to check the radio link connections between nodes for message 
reception. Since, wireless medium is shared all of OLSR data channels are modeled as global 
variables and local functions for message processing, stated in local declarations of Node 
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model. The channels use a global flag RadioBusy to indicate whether a channel is busy or free. 
This flag can be used to check if a node is allowed to broadcast a message or not. All locations 
where global variables have been modified are critical to be executed and modeled by urgent or 
committed locations. Upon receiving a HB in state REC_BEACON, the node checks if this 
beacon is received the first time (INIT= =true). If this guard is satisfied, the sender node is 
assigned as a parent of the current node model. Finally, the node model transmits HB 
(SEND_HELLO) using broadcast channel and moves back to the LISTEN location clearing the 
RadioBusy flag.  A node is in the state START_DATA when it senses INT_EVENT generated 
by the event model. A guard about internal event - internal_invent(N_ID) is triggered when a 
node has a packet to send.  A node broadcasts the packet to all its MRPs and remembers the 
sequence number (seq_numb) of every received packet to avoid cycling. After the state 
“LISTEN” we put the guard Buffer[N_ID].seq_numb<cur_numb. More complex procedure is 
adopted when data is received (DATA[N_ID]?) by a node.  
To model the selfish behavior we designate a set of nodes to be selfish with certain degree. 
Selfish node is implemented in the model by a flag for ‘Selfishness’ in the upper edge after the 
state FLAG_ATTACK and by a number to announce its Ds, refer to figure 1.  These nodes 
drop the packets.  Wireless medium is shared, and modeled by global arrays; a global array 
TrafficSent keeps track of the bytes of data messages received by a MRP in the current slot. 
The clock zobs is reset on the transition to EVAL_TRAFFIC. The Ds is estimated by the local 
function eval_SentTraffic. If EDs(λ) is >3 the selfish node is excluded from connectivity 
matrix. If EDs(λ) is in the interval [2-3]  the willingness of a node is reduced to a certain 
degree: 
trafficSent [MRPobs] [MRPi or 1-hop node] [s] 
when (SNMRPobs== SNMRPi or N1H) 
if (trafficSent[MRPi][ MRPj or 1-hop node][ s2] / 
 trafficSent[MRPi][ MRPj or 1-hop node][ s0]) >2 & <3) 
CASE2:  hello_beacon.Willingness=WILL_NEVER 
CASE3:  can_hear[MRPobs][ MRPi or 1-hop node]=0; //isolate selfish node 
THEN updateTopology=true; 
 
3. SIMULATION AND VERIFICATION OF THE R-OLSR 
In this section we present the simulation results of figure 3 based on applying formal modeling 
to expose MANETs to selfish behavior. Finally, the correct work of the proposed R-OLSR 
protocol in UPPAAL has been verified. 
 
Fig. 3. Node Model implementing R-OLSR Protocol. 
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Different number of selfish nodes with different grade of selfishness has been simulated. In 
Fig.4, two selfish nodes (0 and 3) with changeable Ds in the range [0-100%] affect the number 
of sent packets. As seen, when a selfish node has Ds = 100% the packets from Source 4 are not 
routed correctly by OLSR to Node 2. When the node implements R-OLSR protocol, the 
packets reach destination node, since R-OLSR removes selfish node from MANETs or assigns 
willingness of a node to WILL_NEVER and update topology by sending TC messages. Thus, 
nodes are informed by TC messages that Node 1 and Node 5 are current MRPs. Source 4 could 
send data to destination 2 via three pairs of MRPs: 3,0; 1,0; 5,6. At the beginning of the 
simulation nodes 0 and 3 are elected as MRPs. Then Node 3 is first detected as selfish and after 
topology update node 1 is elected as MRP. Then Node 0 is detected as selfish and after 
topology updates the path to destination goes via nodes 5 and 6. 
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Fig. 4. Packets Delivery. 
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Fig. 5. Packets Delivery Ratio 
In Fig. 5, the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) in function of time has been analyzed. PDR is the 
percentage of data packets that can be successfully delivered from the source nodes to their 
destination nodes. All nodes implement R-OLSR and there was one selfish node (Node 3) with 
three different degree of selfishness – 10, 50 and 80%. The time when the R-OLSR isolates the 
selfish nodes on routing corresponding to 5 steps, 10 seconds each. We found out 5 steps as 
enough for avoiding false detections; however 1 step also works out, but is not so robust against 
collisions.  
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3.1.  Verification 
The main purpose of a model-checker is to verify the model requirement specification via 
machine readable query language consisting of path formulae and state formulae []. State 
formulae describe individual states, whereas path formulae quantify over paths. Path 
formulae can be classified into reachability, safety and liveness. 
 
 Reachability Properties are often used while designing a model to perform sanity 
checks. They ask whether a given state formula ϕ, eventually can be satisfied along 
the path, i.e., that some state satisfying ϕ should be reachable using the path 
formula E<> ϕ 
 Safety Properties are on the form: “something will possibly never happen”. For 
instance in a model of a communication protocol, a safety property might be: hello 
beaconing will always finished. In UPPAAL this is written using formula A[]. 
 Liveness Properties are on the form: something will eventually happen, e.g., any 
message that has been sent should eventually be received. In Uppaal these 
properties are written as A<> ϕ or ϕ --> ψ 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The study addresses the security of MANETs proactive routing protocol OLSR in respect of a 
routing service to remain stable when some nodes drop data packets and prevent data generated 
from the source nodes to reach the destination nodes. The main contribution of this work is 
formal modeling of reliable OLSR routing protocol in UPPAAL that works better in the 
presence of selfish or black hole nodes on packet forwarding. A novel way for isolating these 
nodes via triggering topology control update has been proposed. Simulations in UPPAAL 
showed that detection and isolation of selfish nodes doesn’t introduce control overhead, time 
delay on packets forwarding and doesn’t depend on predefined thresholds. The approach 
avoids false detections based on collisions and power control schemes.  
The proposed clear rule for defense against selfish behavior or black hole attack is enough 
general and can be incorporated into other MANETs routing protocols which use designated 
nodes for packets forwarding, such as cluster heads or master nodes. As the future, we would 
like to learn about the node anomaly and derive rules for defense on MPR nodes by 
implementing lightweight evolving fuzzy reasoning. 
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Fig. 2.  Node Model implementing R-OLSR Protocol 
 
 
 
   
